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CODE REVISION IN MISSOURI
In a public address at Indianapolis some time ago, President
Wilson said: "I am not one of those who doubt either the integrity
or the learning of the courts of the United States, but I do know that
they have a very antiquated way of doing business. I do know that
the United States in its judicial procedure is many decades behind
every other civilized government in the world; and I say there is an
immediate and imperative call upon us to rectify this condition, be-
cause the speediness of justice, the inexpensiveness of justice, the
ready access of justice is the greater part of justice itself. If you
have to be rich to get justice, because of the cost of the very process
itself, then there is no justice." What the President has said of the
federal courts can be applied even more strongly to procedure in
the courts of Missouri.
The civil and criminal codes of Missouri were, in the first
instance, largely borrowed from the codes of the older states, our
present civil code dating from the year 1835. Starting with two hun-
dred and seventy-three short sections, including those relating to
chancery practice, it has grown by amendments and additions to
nearly one thousand sections, some of which are of great length and
cover many subjects. In addition, our criminal code contains about
five hundred sections. During the past eighty years these codes
have, in the main, remained the same, with additions and amend-
ments now and then as above indicated, but which have not always
resulted in their betterment. Since their adoption, no general revision
has been attempted, imperative as has been the need resulting from
the changed social and economic conditions of the state.
Specific Objections.
Our present code of civil procedure is not wholly bad nor is it
designedly vicious, but it is too rigid and yields itself too readily to
the "sporting theory" of justice, invites delays and is full of pitfalls
for the feet of the unwary. It gives undue importance to the record
so that in many instances we have the spectacle of the court devoting
its whole time and energy to a trial of the record, and not of the
cause upon its merits. It allows too much piece-meal disposition of
controversies. It involves or permits too many trials and too much
retrial, especially as to issues of fact. In addition, it is freely charged
that litigation costs more in Missouri than in any other state in the
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Union. Whether this latter charge be true cannot be asserted from
personal knowledge or experience of the writer, but it cannot be
denied that our system strongly tends to the excessive and unneces-
sary accumulation of costs. It is certainly within the personal ex-
perience or observation of every practicing lawyer in this state that
cases involving originally but small amounts or trivial matters can be,
and not infrequently are, kept in court until the costs largely exceed
the amount involved. This ought not to be possible under any system
of procedure, for, referring to the words of the President, "if you
have to be rich to get justice, because of the very cost of the process
itself, then there is no justice."
Our constitution declares that right and justice should be ad-
ministered without sale, denial, or delay, yet in our highest and final
court in this state a litigant in an ordinary civil action cannot now
expect a decision of his case in less than three years, and sometimes
longer; and if there be a reversal and the case is remanded for another
trial, and the whole torturous process required to be repeated, the
time that he is kept in court, trial and appellate, may be and often-
times is extended to six and even ten years and longer. This delay
in many instances amounts to an absolute denial of justice. An
actual case may be given as typical of many others. More than
ten years ago, in one of the circuits of this state, an action was
begun by an unlettered, penniless and aged woman for the pos-
session of forty acres of unimproved land to which she claimed
title by gift from the former owner with whom she had lived and
whom she had faithfully served for forty years prior to his death.
The proof as to the gift was overwhelming and thoroughly convincing
and in fact has never been seriously controverted by the defendants,
but upon one ground and another the case has been to the supreme
court three separate times, the last appeal resulting in the case being
reversed and remanded for a new trial, so that as far as the final
determination of the litigation is concerned, the case is now just where
it was when first begun, and under our system of procedure
it is still possible to keep it in court indefinitely. The plaintiff is now
nearly ninety years of age, and in the usual course of human experi-
ence can hardly expect to outlive the lawsuit begun by her more than
ten years ago. Assuming the merit of plaintiff's claim, who would
have the hardihood to say that the delay in this case has not amounted
to a substantial denial of justice? But it may be claimed that this is
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an exceptional case. The deplorable fact, however, is that it is not,
but can be duplicated in the experience or observation of every
reputable attorney of general practice in the state. In 1906, the City
of St. Louis passed a law regulating the construction of billboards, yet
for fully seven years it was a dead letter by reason of pending and
continued litigation over same. In 1903, the same city passed what
was known as the street railway mill-tax ordinance, yet the litigation
to determine the validity of this ordinance was extended for consider-
ably more than ten years. And so other cases might be cited, almost
ad infinitum, for the books are full of them. The result has been a
general loss of respect for the courts and our entire system of juris-
prudence on the part of the public. This criticism is not directed
towards the courts or judges, but against a system of court procedure
under which such a condition of affairs is made possible.
The supreme courts of many of our sister states, with no larger
working force and with as large a volume of business, keep up with
their dockets and, assuming that our appellate court judges are just
as able and industrious as those of our sister states, with an improved
system of appellate procedure, our people may reasonably expect our
appellate court judges to likewise promptly and finally dispose of all
cases appealed to their respective courts. It may be true, as claimed
by some, that the present congested state of the docket of our
supreme court is due in part to court rules and custom which the
court, of itself, has the power to change, and if this be a fact then it is
hoped that the court will, in recognition of a serious condition and in
response to the undoubted sentiment of the state, of its own initiative,
make such changes in these rules, customs and procedure as will give
all possible relief.
Notwithstanding the honest efforts of the judges of our courts,
trial and appellate, to render just decisions, yet when we consider the
prevalent delay. the unnecessary expenditure of time and effort and
money, the hindrance of just rights through long-continued defensive
litigation without substantial merit, the litigants who abandon their
pursuit of justice through weariness or lack of means, the citizens
who abandon their rights rather than incur the annoying and injurious
incidents of litigation in the effort to enforce them, the emboldening
of the unscrupulous in whose hands delay and difficulty and expense
of litigation are weapons with which to force compromises without
just grounds-when we consider all these incidents of our present
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system of procedure in Missouri, we are bound to admit that thorough
and radical changes in our judicial and procedural systems are re-
quired. Nor can the delay in the determination of cases in our appel-
late courts be remedied by merely increasing the judicial force. We
have tried that expedient in the past, but ineffectually. The only real
remedy is by reforming the system.
This article is not intended as a bill of particulars, hence one
illustration only as to needed changes must suffice. Under our present
code, appeals are unnecessarily cumbersome and expensive. Our ap-
pellate courts are burdened with voluminous records which they are
unable to read in the time at their command and which, instead of
aiding, seriously hamper and delay the determination of causes in
such courts. It was stated in a committee report made recently by
a member of the supreme court to the State Bar Association that in
the cases appealed to that court the records averaged over two hun-
dred and fifty printed pages of bare record, not including the printed
briefs and arguments of counsel. Every practicing lawyer knows
that the greater part of these voluminous records, except in the most
exceptional cases, are wholly unnecessary for the proper presenta-
tion of the issues submitted to the appellate court for determination,
yet under the provisions of our code permitting the filing of a bill of
exceptions embracing a verbatim copy of all the oral proceedings in
the trial court, the judges of the appellate courts are compelled to
waste precious time in reading hundreds of pages of record to gather
facts that could have been easily given in as many lines. Would not
common sense dictate an amendment of our code whereby appellants
shall be required to present to the appellate court only such matters
and only so much of the record as is necessary for a proper under-
standing and determination of the issues submitted to that court?
In breaking away from the common law procedure, especially
as to pleading, in the construction of our code and in the numerous
additions and amendments thereto, we have made the mistake of
attempting to cover by specific statute every possible contingency that
may arise in a lawsuit. Such a course inevitably leads to the dis-
covery of new contingencies and unanticipated results, requiring con-
tinual amendment and supplement. As a general proposition, the
fewer statutory rules there are to create statutory rights intervening
between a citizen's demand for relief and the court's judgment upon
his demand, the better. The detailed provisions of our code create
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a great number of statutory rights which the courts are bound to
respect because they are the law, which litigants are entitled to de-
mand because the law gives these rights to them. In some cases they
may contribute to the attainment of justice, but in many cases they
constitute a serious obstruction. Not infrequently, because of these
inflexible statutory provisions, the courts cannot apply the rule of jus-
tice because they must apply the law. The energies of attorneys and
clients are devoted to these statutory proceedings instead of being ad-
dressed to the trial of the case upon the merits, and the facilities for
delay afforded by them naturally lead to innumerable defenses for the
mere purpose of delay. The great volume and technical character of
our code covering every step of the procedure from the issuing of
summons to final judgment, has tended to breed a class of code lawyers,
acute and skilful in baffling the efforts of honest men seeking to get
their rights, and with apparently no conception of the fundamental
principles of jurisprudence or of the high duty of the lawyer to secure
substantial justice for his client. At their hands, with our code, jus-
tice is easily tangled in a net of form. The public estimate of the
profession of law is lowered, public confidence in the administration
of justice is weakened, and daily men suffer grievous wrongs in silence
or yield to inequitable settlements rather than hazard the assertion
of their claims in the courts. Referring again to the case of the old
woman above mentioned-her petition, as last presented to the trial
court, was in two counts, one in ejectment and the other to declare,
determine and vest title. The count in ejectment was tried before
a jury and the other, of course, before the court. The trial of the
law count before the jury was had first and upon a verdict being
rendered in favor of the plaintiff, judgment was at once entered upon
same by the clerk without waiting for the judgment of the court on
the equity count, which was not entered until some days later. But
alas, plaintiff's attorney had overlooked the fact, and the court's and
clerk's attention was not called to it, that safely stowed away in the
one thousand and more pigeon-holes of our code was a statutory pro-
vision to the effect that the judgment on the one count must await
the trial on the other, and for this oversight alone, the case, oi the
last appeal, was reversed and remanded and the old woman required
to start on her weary round again.
Senator Root, late president of the American Bar Association, in
speaking of procedure in the courts of the United States in a recent
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address, said, "We share with England and her colonies a highly
artificial and technical body of rules of evidence, such as obtain no-
where else in the civilized world. These rules afford most delightful
exercise for intellectual acumen, but it is doubtful if they produce
as good results as the simple methods which obtain in the trial of
cases in countries that follow the course of the civil law." The funda-
mental disadvantage of the rules of evidence obtaining in Missouri,
in common with her sister states, is that when strictly and technically
applied they do not correspond with the instincts or the habits or the
common sense of any plain, sensible layman in the world. Their strict
application continually impresses litigants with a sense of unreason-
able and unjust restraint, giving a feeling of being bottled up and
prevented from telling the whole truth, and leaving a sense of not
having been allowed to present their whole case to the court. Again
says Mr. Root, "In the strictness and technicality with which we
enforce these rules we go far beyond England or, so far as I know,
any of her colonies. I think we stand alone among civilized countries
in the obstacles that we interpose to the giving of testimony in the
most natural way. How common it is to see a witness trying to tell
his story, hindered and worried and confused by being stopped here
and there again and again by objections as to irrelevancy and imma-
teriality and hearsay, when what he is trying to say would not do the
slightest harm to anyone and would merely help him to state what
he knows that is really competent and material." And let those who
would abolish entirely our statutory code and substitute therefor rules
of court covering all matters of procedure, bear in mind the fact
that these rules of evidence complained of, and which so seriously
hamper the administration of justice in this and other states, are
largely court made. Therefore, let not this sin, at least, or its con-
tinuation, be laid at the door of our legislature.
Space forbids any separate or extended consideration of our
criminal code, but it may be said that the just and humane principle
of law that every person charged with crime is, and should remain,
clothed with the presumption of innocence until his guilt has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, should neither be abandoned,
changed or amended, but we should recognize the fact that we have
long since reached the point where the criminal or the person charged
with crime no longer needs protection from society or from harsh and
inhumane laws and procedure, but where society needs and should be
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given reasonable protection from the criminal. In the days of Jeffreys
and at a time when, under the English law, there were scores of
offenses punishable by death, many of which are now considered minor,
there was good reason for many of the rules then designed as a shield
and protection for the innocent, but which now serve no purpose but
that of a means of escape for the guilty. The reason for the rule
having disappeared, the rule should no longer be retained.
The great trouble with criminal procedure in Missouri, and in
most of our sister states, is that, in our zeal to give persons charged
with crime a fair trial, we have gone too far-so far, in fact, that in
cases where the defense has plenty of money and able counsel it is
very hard to convict, and then generally only after great travail and
much expense and delay. Through the years, various provisions of
law, as a rule wholly favorable to the person charged with crime, have
been enacted by our legislature and generally at the instance of
lawyers making a specialty of criminal practice, and the time is now
right for their revision or repeal. We need a simple criminal code-
one that is fair to persons charged with crime, but one that is also
fair to the state.
Why Has Revision Been So Long Delayed?
It is always easier to define a problem than it is to suggest a
solution, and, again, while the public may agree in general terms yet
when it is attempted to embody these principles into concrete laws
it is very difficult to so frame them that they will not meet opposition
from some source or faction. Another deterrent has been, and is,
the lack of political value in such legislation. Our legislators are
prone to give time and attention to matters which attract public at-
tention, either to themselves or to their measures, and are not inclined
to give a proper or necessary amount of time to the construction and
enactment of laws dealing with the minutiae of criminal or civil pro-
cedure. This is not intended as a reflection upon our Missouri law-
makers, for the same condition exists in every state and in the Con-
gress of the United States; and the foregoing observation is but a
statement of fact well known to all and freely acknowledged by legis-
lators themselves.
Another reason has been, until the last few years, the apathy and
lack of interest on the part of the general public. The average citizen,
as concerns court procedure and his personal experiences therewith,
has been generally like the boy who stumps his toe while running-he
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pauses for a moment to nurse the toe, perhaps curses the stone a little,
amd then passes on, but leaves the stone still lying in the road. Intelli-
gent laymen, however, are fast becoming aroused to the fact that a
simplified and common-sense system of court procedure is not merely
a matter of professional interest but is an economic and social problem
of the gravest and most general importance.
Then again, courts and lawyers are proverbially conservative.
They are slow to adopt innovations of any kind and are much inclined
to continue to do things in the same old way, some freely avowing
that if any material changes are made in our system of procedure they
would be put to the necessity of "learning everything over again."
That is, whilst the proposed changes might be good for the people
yet they might be temporarily inconvenient for the lawyers.
There has been opposition from other sources, more or less active
and potent, but the strongest and most effectual resistance to any and
all reformation has come from that class of lawyers representing spe-
cial business interests and, as concerns the criminal code, from lawyers
making a specialty of the criminal practice. This opposition is wholly
selfish and unworthy of our most honorable profession, but be it added,
in simple justice, there are numerous and honorable exceptions to the
classes mentioned. The editor of a leading St. Louis newspaper put
it bluntly but not unfairly when he said, "Another reason why legal
methods have not been brought up to date is that a small but ex-
tremely active section of the bar has opposed improvement. There
are men who make money out of the law's delays. Some of them are
helping large corporations to break the law; others are helping crimi-
nals to escape the penitentiary."
How Can a Reformation Best Be Accomplished?
Sporadic attempts have been made in years past, by the Missouri
Bar Association, Judicial Conferences, individual lawyers and mem-
bers of the General Assembly, to remedy conditions, but not until
recent years has there seemed to be such concert of action on the part
of our citizens generally as gives promise of relief. This relief could
in some instances be given by our appellate courts if our judges but
had the backbone and initiative to break away from precedents which,
on account of changed social and economic conditions, should no
longer control them. That our courts are beginning to throw off the
shackles that have heretofore bound them is evidenced by such de-
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cisions as that in the case of State vs. O'Kelley and Fitch, and others
that might be mentioned. There are other conditions, however, which
the courts cannot change, but from which the legislature, by statutory
enactment, can and should give relief. There are still other con-
ditions which cannot be changed or remedied save by constitutional
amendment.
Some members of our profession present as a sure palliative
for all the ills complained of, a proposition to clothe the supreme court
with power to make rules governing all matters of practice and pro-
cedure in the trial and appellate courts, which shall take the place of
all present statutory provisions. They frankly confess their inability
to grapple with the situation themselves and would wash their hands
of the whole business by "leaving it to the supreme court." Briefly,
but fairly, their argument is this: That sessions of the legislature are
held biennially and then only for a period of about seventy days;
that a revision of the code in this short time is out of the question;
that under the constitution the supreme court has a general superin-
tending control over all other courts, and, of necessity, observes and
passes in review the practice and procedure in all of the courts of
the state in every variety of litigation, and is, therefore, more com-
petent than any other body in our scheme of government to determine
the practice and procedure which will facilitate the determination of
cases upon their merits with the least delay and at the least expense;
that unlike the legislature, with its hurried biennial sessions, the su-
preme court, being a continuous body, can amend rules and make new
rules whenever the occasion may require; that the courts and the
profession are held responsible for the unnecessary expense, delay and
uncertainty of litigation, and should therefore be allowed to make the
rules which govern practice and procedure, and that being held thus
in public opinion to full responsibility they should be given correspond-
ing power.
Other members of the profession, constituting, it is believed, a
considerable majority, do not believe that the time has yet come, in
this state, at least, when it would be wise to attempt so radical an
innovation. They do not believe that our supreme court would be
more responsive to any real or proper demand for changes in our
codes of procedure than would our lawmaking body. In fact, they
assert that the history of judicial procedure in this and other coun-
tries proves absolutely to the contrary; that courts and lawyers are
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proverbially conservative and that most reforms and changes have
come only at the insistent demand of the people; that our appellate
courts, even as to matters clearly within their powers, have invariably
been very slow to abandon or change any custom, rule or practice of
long standing, however obsolete, cumbersome or ill-adapted it may
have become; that the much heralded rules governing practice in
equity cases promulgated a few years ago by the United States Su-
preme Court were the result only of an insistent public demand and
after many years of agitation; that no lawmaking body has ever been
so slow in responding to an unquestioned public necessity as was this
court; that our state supreme court is now three years behind with
is civil docket and that it would be unwise, under present conditions,
to place this additional burden upon them; that the most practical
course for those who really want relief from present conditions would
be to agree upon and then secure the adoption by the legislature of
some workable plan that will enable our supreme court to clear its
docket before we give them any more or different kind of work to
do; that the only reason we have not in the past obtained from the
General Assembly desired remedial legislation is that, as lawyers, we
have not first agreed among ourselves upon what we wanted, but have
awways gone before that body with a divided front.
And so the contention runs. But even in this controversy there
is much of hope. Aggressive interest has taken the place of indif-
ference and, with honest minds aroused and seeking the light, the
right way will surely be found.
DAVID H. HARaIs.
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